Why the U.S. Marines Should Not Ditch Their Tanks

Caleb Larson’s article, Why the U.S. Marines Want to Ditch Their Tanks — 19FortyFiveinspires a response. A more accurate title would have been “Why the U.S. Marines No Longer Want to Close with and Destroy the Enemy.”

It is surprising how little debate within the Marine Corps occurred around this subject. Except for Jim Webb (Senator/Navy Secretary/Marine combat veteran), there also seems to have been little discussion in the defense community or the halls of Congress.

Instead of focusing on countering violent extremists and sustained combat operations in “every clime and place” the Marine Corps will now focus on great power/peer-level competition with a special emphasis on “one clime and place.”

This is a profound shift from inland to littoral and will demand greater integration with the Navy. The Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) states that “Our current force design, optimized for large scale amphibious forcible entry and sustained operations ashore…are no longer what the nation requires of the Marine Corps.”

The Service’s emphasis on combat in the littoral’s has been going on since the 1980’s. The Navy has not proven to be a reliable partner in this endeavor. This can be partially attributed to the fact that a Naval officer’s career thrives in the “Blue Water Navy,” while an assignment in the “Brown Water Navy” is a career dead-end. This can be attributed to the fact that the last large scale amphibious forcible entry occurred in 1950. The United States hasn’t had this capability in decades; which explains why the Maritime Pre-Positioning Force concept was developed.

The Corps is banking on a profound technological evolution in warfare; thus the CPG looks to position the Corps for the battlefield of 2030. However, the CPG fails to acknowledge the failure of the United States to “close the deal” in both Iraq and Afghanistan because we did not have enough boots on the ground to control real estate and maintain post-conflict stability. In both instances we won the war and failed to achieve our objective of creating stable regimes.

These debates are not new, in the 1950’s there was a debate between Eisenhower and Ridgeway over how the U.S. could best face the Soviet threat. Eisenhower advocated for nuclear weapons and strategic air power, Ridgeway for capable ground units. History proved Ridgeway right and the forward-thinking advocates of war wrong. Ridgeway believed confrontation with the Soviet Union would take the form of proxy wars. To think confrontation with China would be limited is not realistic, it would be a choice between suicide and surrender.

The Corps evolved from a loose organization of small units primarily serving on ships, patterned after the British Royal Marines both in organization and mission, to the expeditionary force that has served the nation well since 1942. The Marines forte is “getting sustained combat power, the furthest and fastest, quickly allowing the United States to protect its interests.”

Prior to the First World War, the United States focused on naval power. With a large immigrant population, standing armies were viewed with suspicion (the Army was 5% the size of France, 9% the size of Germany’s). Focus was on the western hemisphere, with the Panama Canal being the critical real estate. The Navy was centered on the battleship, but the ability to support the fleet was lacking. Advance bases were needed to support the fleet and protect the canal. This mission fell to the Corps.

The Spanish American War transformed the nation into a colonial power with distant interests; the need for advanced bases grew more urgent. In 1903 the Joint Army and Navy Board was established to coordinate the actions of the Army and Navy. The Army wanted no part of the Advance Base mission, which by default rendered it a Marine Corps mission. The Corps was now America’s colonial infantry.

The Marine Corps had to develop tactics and logistics to take disparate ships companies and detachments and quickly form them into larger units as needed. The first test of this organization was at Vera Cruz in Mexico, where Marines first fought in regimental strength.

With the First World War, the Marines realized the Corps needed to expand and develop the ability to fight in sustained land operations. The Marine Brigade became part of the 2nd Division U.S. Army. It was this division, with the Marine Brigade leading the first attack, that was America’s first exercise of offensive power at the division level on a foreign shore.

Since then, the U.S. Marines have provided the first offensive capability for the country in every war and action since.

In August 1942, the First Marine Division attacked Guadalcanal supported by a Tank Battalion equipped with light tanks. The airfield was quickly seized, but it took six months to secure the entire island. The ability of the division to conduct offensive operations beyond the airfield was hampered by a lack of firepower.

The Guadalcanal experience demonstrated that light tanks lacked the firepower, mobility, and survivability to overcome entrenched defenders. This led to the transition to the Sherman tank at Tarawa. Throughout the Pacific, close terrain, urban areas, and hardened defenses required fighting so close, that naval gunfire, air, and artillery were deemed too hazardous. Only tanks could provide the close fire support the infantry needed.

In Korea the Marines provided the first main battle tanks at the Pusan Perimeter in Korea, providing mobile defense and offensive capability. Tanks continued to play a critical role at Inchon, and beyond.

In the first major offensive operation in Vietnam, Operation Starlite showed the value of tank equipped combined arms teams. The results were in stark contrast to the experience in the Ia Drang Valley, where close fighting inhibited the effectiveness of indirect fire and resulted in a high casualty rate.

Operation Desert Storm/Shield validated the MPF concept. Through the employment of the MPF squadrons, the Marine’s quickly provided the first credible military deterrence to Iraqi forces posturing on the Saudi border, a division with two tank battalions. Ultimately, the Marines deployed two divisions with five tank battalions representing a quarter of the American divisions deployed.

Afghanistan and Iraq continued to demonstrate the Marines’ ability to quickly provide offensive combined arms forces. Tanks weren’t initially part of the force that went into Afghanistan, but they were eventually introduced. Support was initially provided by the Dutch, but eventually Marine tanks were deployed. In Iraq, as with Desert Storm, the Corps’ ability to bring tanks made it an integral part of the attack, allowing them to knife through Iraqi defenses and cities, until a Marine tank unit tore down Saddam’s statue in Baghdad. The two Marine divisions made up one-third of the American ground forces in the invasion. Another development in Iraq was the value of the tanks dwell time and precision fire power to support operations in the urban environment. Once again, the fighting was too close for air and artillery support to the infantry. The tank had the survivability to get close and their use minimized collateral damage.

Marine Corps’ detractors often criticize the Corps as a “Second Land Army” however, history has shown it is actually the “First Land Army.”

The Commandant’s guidance eliminates tanks, cannon artillery and other capabilities from the Marine’s tool box. The logic underpinning this is two-fold, tank weight/logistical challenges, and the existence of multiple longer range anti-tank capabilities.

The comment has been made that we don’t need heavy, manned anti-tank platforms, this is accurate. The MAGTF Commander has drones, fixed wing attack aircraft and attack helicopters that can counter an armor threat. However, history has demonstrated time-and-time again that tanks must be considered more than an anti-tank capability; it is a close in, survivable infantry support platform with unmatched accuracy, lethality and dwell time. The tank brings offensive capability to shatter enemy formations, overcome hardened defenses, provide accurate fire support in the close environment, drive deep through enemy defenses disrupting and destroying their command, control and logistics. History is replete with examples where the infantry/tank team saves lives in close and urban terrain. Without tanks how will the Marine Corps exert its will over the enemy? AAV’s, JLTV’s and LAV’s can provide the speed and the anti-tank fire, but they won’t be survivable in the close, civilian strewn battlefield.

We celebrate our battle history as Marines, but the real strength of the Corps has been logisticians. The Corps cracked the code on getting tanks to the battlefield in 1943, these capabilities have kept pace as different tanks have come into service. Weight as an excuse seems more like a case of not wanting to. This may be legitimate, but based on the proposed force structure changes I only see a capability going away. How will it be replaced?

The Corps has been blessed with prescient thinkers. It has a tradition of innovation and decentralization that empowers small unit leaders and individual Marines. The Marines got where they are through evolution. Maybe this new generation of leaders are equally prescient. However, we can’t ignore the fact that in both Iraq and Afghanistan we won the war, but failed to win the peace, because we ascribed to the attractiveness of a clean war through precision fires. We cannot continue to dismiss the requirement for boots on the ground. An enduring physical presence demonstrates American commitment to ensuring stability; and nothing signals America’s resolve like the presence of tanks.

The Marine Corps represents one-quarter of America’s ground combat power. In terms of conventional firepower these innovations are a degradation of American combat power. All conceivable peer/near-peer threats possess significant armored capability. The Marine Corps now focuses on one contingency. One unlikely to occur, it is hard to conceive a limited confrontation not leading to an existential threat to the entire planet.

This strategy makes the Marines into an organization of three divisions “too light to fight” with their own private air force. I can’t see how this is a prudent investment?